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Abstract—Truthful spectrum auctions have been extensively
studied in recent years. Truthfulness makes bidders bid their true
valuations, simplifying greatly the analysis of auctions. However,
revealing one’s true valuation causes severe privacy disclosure to
the auctioneer and other bidders. To make things worse, previous
work on secure spectrum auctions does not provide adequate
security. In this paper, based on TRUST, we propose PS-TRUST,
a provably secure solution for truthful double spectrum auctions.
Besides maintaining the properties of truthfulness and special
spectrum reuse of TRUST, PS-TRUST achieves provable security
against semi-honest adversaries in the sense of cryptography.
Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids to anyone
in the auction, except the auction result. To the best of our
knowledge, PS-TRUST is the first provably secure solution for
spectrum auctions. Furthermore, experimental results show that
the computation and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is
modest, and its practical applications are feasible.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the rapid development of wireless technologies, the
scarcity of radio spectrum attracts more and more attention.
Under the traditional static spectrum allocation scheme by
government, the utilization of the radio spectrum is severely
inefficient. Many spectrum channels are idle most of the
time under their current owners, whereas ever-increasing new
wireless users are starving for spectrum. Therefore, spectrum
redistribution is highly significant for improving the overall
spectrum utilization and thus alleviating the problem of spec-
trum scarcity. Open markets for spectrum redistribution, such
as Spectrum Bridge [13], have already appeared to provide
services for buying, selling, and leasing idle spectrum.
As a well-known approach to spectrum redistribution, spec-
trum auctions are preferred by people for its fairness and
allocation efficiency. In recent years, there have been exten-
sive studies on spectrum auctions, most of which achieve
truthfulness to make bidders reveal their true valuations of
spectrum channels. However, revealing one’s true valuation
causes severe privacy disclosure. Literature [20] illustrated
two vulnerabilities of truthful auctions, i.e. frauds of the
insincere auctioneer, and bid-rigging between the auctioneer
and the bidders, in which the auctioneer takes advantage of
the knowledge of bidders’ bids. Furthermore, when one bidder
knows other bidders’ bids after an auction, he will probably
not bid his true valuation in repeated auctions. That is, an
original truthful auction will probably become untruthful when
repeated, due to the revelation of all bidders’ bids in the
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Fig. 1. Auction Framework for PS-TRUST
previous auctions [3]. Therefore, protecting the privacy of
bidders is of great importance.
There have been many researches on privacy preserving
auctions, such as [8][11][9][10]. However, spectrum is quite
different from traditional goods, for it can be well reused in
both spatial and time dimensions. Thus, traditional privacy
preserving auctions cannot be directly applied to spectrum
auctions. Recently, some works about privacy preserving spec-
trum auctions have also been proposed [20][21]. These works
dealt with only single-sided spectrum auctions. Furthermore,
they fell short of providing adequate security. In the sense of
cryptography, a protocol is secure implies that no participating
party can learn any information beyond the output of the
protocol. However, both the two approaches reveal some
information that cannot be inferred from the outputs. For
example, in [20], the auctioneer can easily get the sums of
bids for all the possible allocations for each subnetwork by
decrypting Eξ; in [21], the auctioneer gets to know the bids
of all buyer groups and their ranking order in the auctions.
The information mentioned above is more than the auction
result, which normally includes the winner set and the pricing
information.
In this paper, we propose PS-TRUST, a provably secure
solution for truthful double spectrum auctions. The auction
framework of PS-TRUST is shown as in Fig. 1. This frame-
work introduces an auction agent who cooperates with the
auctioneer to securely compute the auctions. Neither the
auctioneer nor the auction agent is a trusted party, but they
are assumed not to collude with each other. Furthermore, we
restrict that bidders can only communicate with the auctioneer,
keeping the communication pattern simple and identical to
that of an insecure auction. PS-TRUST reveals nothing but the
auction result including the selling and buying clearing prices,
and the seller and buyer winner sets. The main contributions
can be summarized as follows.
(1) We design PS-TRUST based on homomorphic encryp-
2tion schemes. By representing the bids in encrypted bit vectors
(EBVs), we design secure algorithms for addition, constant
multiplication, and maximum/minimum selection for EBV
bids. And then, based on these algorithms, we present a secure
auction procedure, which reveals nothing about the bids except
the auction result.
(2) We apply the definition of security against semi-honest
adversaries to formally prove the security of PS-TRUST. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to formally
prove the security, in the sense of cryptography, of a solution
to spectrum auctions.
(3) We analyze the computation and communication com-
plexities of PS-TRUST, implement it in Java to evaluate
running times and message volumes, and conclude that its
computation and communication overhead is modest.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, a brief review of related work is given. In Section
III, we describe the problem statement. Next, we provide some
preliminaries in Section IV. In Section V, we present the
detailed design of PS-TRUST, and prove formally its security.
Then, in Section VI, we implement PS-TRUST, analyze and
evaluate its computation and communication overhead. Finally,
we conclude our work in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Spectrum auctions have been studied extensively in recent
years. For instance, Zhou et al. proposed VERITAS [1],
a single-sided truthful spectrum auction supporting diverse
bidding formats. Zhou et al. proposed TRUST [2], the first
truthful double spectrum auction framework enabling spectrum
reuse. Deek et al. proposed Topaz [14] to tackle time-based
cheating in online spectrum auctions. Al-Ayyoub and Gupta
[15] designed a polynomial-time truthful spectrum auction
mechanism with a performance guarantee on revenue. Xu et
al. [16][17] proposed efficient online spectrum allocations in
multi-channel wireless networks. TAHES [18] addressed the
issue of heterogeneous spectrums in truthful double spectrum
auctions. Dong et al. [19] tackled the spectrum allocation
problem with time-frequency flexibility in cognitive radio
networks via combinatorial auction. However, most of the
existing spectrum auction mechanisms do not provide any
guarantee of security.
Extensive work has focused on privacy preserving auction
design in the past decade. Brandt and Sandholm [12] inves-
tigated unconditional full privacy in sealed-bid auctions. In
[8] [11][9][10] the authors employed various cryptography
techniques to achieve security in diverse auction schemes.
Unfortunately, when applied to spectrum auctions, these tradi-
tional privacy preserving auctions either require exponential
complexity, or lead to significant degradation of spectrum
utilization. Recently, papers [20] and [21] provide solutions for
privacy preserving spectrum auctions, but they only addressed
single-sided spectrum auctions. What is more, as mentioned
above, they fell short of providing security in the sense of
cryptography.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Auction Problem
We consider a double spectrum auction, which is single-
rounded with one auctioneer A, a seller set S = {s1, s2,
..., sM}, and a buyer set B = {b1, b2, ..., bN}. In the auction,
each seller si contributes exactly one channel and each buyer
bj requests only one channel. The channels are homogenous
to buyers so that their requests are not channel specific. Each
channel contributed by sellers can potentially be reused by
multiple non-conflicting buyers who are separated far enough.
B. TRUST
TRUST [2] has provided a truthful framework for this
double spectrum auction problem, with spatial spectrum reuse
being well exploited. Since TRUST [2] is based on McAfee’s
double auction design, we briefly review both of them.
1) McAfee’s Design: McAfee’s design of double auctions is
most widely used [6], which achieves economic properties of
truthfulness, individual rationality, and ex-post budget balance.
This design assumes that there are M sellers and N buyers,
and all goods auctioned are homogenous. Each seller si bids
vsi to sell a good, and each buyer bj bids vbj to buy a good.
The auction proceeds as follows:
(1) Bid sorting: Sort bids of sellers in non-decreasing order
and bids of buyers in non-increasing order:
vs1 ≤ v
s
2 ≤ ... ≤ v
s
M
vb1 ≤ v
b
2 ≤ ... ≤ v
b
N
(2) Winner determination: Find k = argmax {vsk ≤ vbk},
the index of the last profitable transaction. Then the first (k−1)
sellers and the first (k − 1) buyers are the auction winners.
(3) Pricing: Pay each winning seller equally by vsk, and
charge each winning buyer equally by vbk.
2) TRUST Design: TRUST followed the methodology of
McAfee’s design, and enabled spectrum spatial reuse. It con-
sists of the following three steps:
(1) Buyer group formation: form non-conflicting buyer
groups based on buyers’ conflict graph but independent of
their bids.
(2) Winner determination: Each buyer group bids a value
obtained by multiplying its smallest buyer bid with its size,
and acts as a single “buyer”. Then the auctioneer applies just
the same winner determination as that of the McAfee’s design,
resulting in that the first (k − 1) sellers and the buyers in the
first (k − 1) buyer groups are the auction winners.
(3) Pricing: Pay each winning seller equally by the kth seller
bid, and charge each buyer group equally by the kth buyer
group bid, which is evenly shared among the buyers in the
group.
C. Securing TRUST
As described above, TRUST has provided a good solution
to the auction problem mentioned. However, in TRUST, no
security issues are considered, and all bids are completely
exposed to the auctioneer, and even to all bidders. This
could result in the following two problems: (1) A dishonest
3auctioneer could temper the auction result to increase his
utility [20]; (2) The knowledge of the historical true valuations
of other bidders could make one bidder conceal his true
valuation in a repetition of a truthful auction [3].
In this work, our aim is to secure TRUST by protecting
the privacy of bidders, i.e., their bids. However, how to
correctly compute the auction while reveal nothing about the
bids beyond the auction result (including selling and buying
clearing prices, seller and buyer winner sets) in the auction
process, is challenging. Furthermore, how to prove the security
in the sense of cryptography is non-trivial, too.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some preliminaries for the
design of PS-TRUST.
A. Security Formulation
In cryptography area, the standard security formulation is
called ideal/real simulation paradigm [4] [5], as shown in Fig.
2. In this formulation, a real protocol execution in the “real
world” is mapped to an ideal functionality calling in the “ideal
world”. In the ideal world, there is an external trusted (and
incorruptible) party willing to help the parties carry out their
computation. The ideal functionality calling means that the
parties simply send their inputs to the trusted party, which
computes the desired functionality and passes each party its
prescribed output. While, in the real world, there is no external
trusted party, and the real protocol execution means the parties
run the protocol amongst themselves without any help. We
say that a protocol is secure if its real protocol execution
emulates its ideal functionality calling. That is, no adversary
can do more harm in its real protocol execution than in its
ideal functionality calling. However, successful adversarial
attacks cannot be performed in the ideal functionality calling.
We therefore conclude that all adversarial attacks on the real
protocol execution must also fail for a secure protocol.
Real World Ideal World
Fig. 2. The Security Formulation of Ideal/Real Simulation Paradigm
B. Adversarial Models
Under the security formulation of “ideal/real simulation
paradigm”, the adversarial models can be classified as semi-
honest adversarial model and malicious adversarial model [4].
In semi-honest adversarial model, even a corrupted party
correctly follows the protocol specification. However, the
adversary obtains the internal state of all the corrupted parties,
and attempts to use this to learn information more than the
output. This adversarial model may be used in settings where
running the “correct” protocol can be enforced. Semi-honest
adversaries are also called “honest-but-curious adversaries”
and “passive adversaries”.
In malicious adversarial model, the corrupted parties can
arbitrarily deviate from the protocol specification, according
to the adversary’s instructions. Security against malicious
adversaries is so strong that it ensures that no adversarial attack
can succeed. Malicious adversaries are also called “active
adversaries”.
Although protocols secure against malicious adversaries
exist theoretically, they are far too inefficient to implement.
So, in this paper, we apply semi-honest adversarial model for
the cause of practical applications. Specifically, in our context,
we assume that the auctioneer and the auction agent follow the
auction protocol specification, but one of them could act as a
semi-honest adversary. The adversary obtains the internal state
of the auction, and attempts to learn information about the bids
beyond the auction result.
C. Paillier Cryptosystem
In order to achieve the security of spectrum auctions, a
semantically secure cryptosystem is needed. In our design,
Paillier’s homomorphic cryptosystem (G,E,D) is applied,
where G, E and D denote the key generation algorithm,
encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm, respectively.
The properties of a Paillier cryptosystem include homomor-
phic addition, indistinguishability, and self-blinding [7]:
(1) Homomorphic addition: The product of two ciphertexts
will decrypt to the sum of their corresponding plaintexts, and
the kth power of a ciphertext will decrypt to the product of k
and its corresponding plaintext.
D(E(m1, r1) ·E(m2, r2) mod N2) = m1 +m2 mod N
D(E(m, r)k mod N2) = k ·m mod N
where N is the product of two large primes, which is public
to users, and r1, r2 and r are random numbers.
(2) Indistinguishability: If the same plaintext m is en-
crypted twice, these two ciphertexts E(m, r1) and E(m, r2)
are totally different, and no one can succeed in distinguishing
them with a significantly higher probability than random guess
without decrypting them.
(3) Self-blinding: Any ciphertext can be publicly changed
into another one without affecting the plaintext. This means
that a randomized chipertext E(m, r′) can be computed from
the ciphertext E(m, r) without knowing eight the decryption
key or the original plaintext.
V. PS-TRUST
In this section, we present the design of PS-TRUST. We
first describe the secure bid representation and operations,
then present the detailed secure auction design, and finally
prove formally that PS-TRUST is secure against semi-honest
adversaries.
4A. Secure Bid Representation and Operations
In PS-TRUST, we use encrypted bit vectors to securely
represent bids.
Definition 1 (Encrypted Bit Vector). The Encrypted Bit Vector
(EBV) representation of value v is a vector e(v) of ciphertexts
like
e(v) = (e1, e2, ..., eK) = (E(σ1), E(σ2), ..., E(σK)) (1)
where E(.) is Paillier’s encryption function, K is the bit
length, (σ1, σ2, ..., σK) denotes the binary representation of v,
with σ1 the most significant bit, and σK the least significant
bit.
With the definition of EBV, we can develop secure algo-
rithms for EBV bid operations including addition, constant
multiplication, and minimum/maximum selection. With these
algorithms, the algorithm runner (AR) without the secret key
can compute the corresponding bid operations on EBV bids,
and get an encrypted result, knowing nothing about the bids.
Then this encrypted result can be used as either an intermediate
result for further computations or a part of the final output
decrypted by the key holder (KH) with the secret key.
But how do we compute on EBV bids? Due to the
homomorphic addition, addition of two values in ZN can
be computed directly by multiplying their ciphertexts, while
multiplication can be computed with the help of the KH who
can do decryption using Protocol 1. Furthermore, the XOR
operation signified by ⊕ can be turned into additions and
multiplications in ZN by the fact that:
c⊕ d = c+ d− 2cd (2)
Thus, to design the secure algorithms for the operations on
EBV bids, we only need to turn all operations into additions
and multiplications in ZN , and XOR operations.
Protocol 1 Product of Two Numbers in Zn
Require:
AR holds E(x) and E(y)
Ensure:
AR holds E(xy)
Step AR1:
1: x1 ∈R Zn; y1 ∈R Zn; // Select randomly
2: E(x2) = E(x).E(−x1); // x2 = x− x1 mod N ;
3: E(y2) = E(y).E(−y1); // y2 = y − y1 mod N ;
4: Sends E(x2) and E(y2) to AA;
Step KH2:
5: x2 = D(E(x2)); y2 = D(E(y2));
6: Sends E(x2y2) to AE;
Step AR3:
7: E(xy) = E(x1y1) · E(y2)x1 · E(x2)y1 ·E(x2y2);
According to the discussion above, the secure algorithms
for EBV bid addition and EBV bid constant multiplication
are straightforward, and are shown in Algorithms 2 and 3,
respectively.
Protocol 2 EBVAdd(e(vA), e(vB))
Input:
EBV bids e(vA) and e(vB)
Output:
Sum e(vAB)
1: Compute Line 2 to 6 over encrypted bits E(σAi ) and
E(σBi ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ K , using homomorphic properties
and Protocol 1.
// For clarity, we describe these lines by plain bits.
2: σABK = σ
A
K ⊕ σ
B
K ; c
AB
K = σ
A
K · σ
B
K ;
3: for (i = K − 1; i >= 1; i = i− 1) do
4: σABi = σ
A
i ⊕ σ
B
i ⊕ c
AB
i+1;
5: cABi = σ
A
i · σ
B
i ⊕ σ
A
i · c
AB
i+1 ⊕ σ
B
i · c
AB
i+1;
6: end for
7: e(vAB) = (E(σAB1 ), E(σ
AB
2 ), ..., E(σ
AB
K ));
8: return e(vAB);
Protocol 3 EBVMul(e(v), n)
Input:
EBV bid e(v) and integer n = (σ(n)1 , σ
(n)
2 , ..., σ
(n)
K )
Output:
Product P = e(n · v)
1: P = e(0);
2: for (i = 1; i <= K; ++i) do
3: if (σ(n)i == 1) then
4: P∗ = e(v) shifted left (K − i) bits;
5: P = EBVAdd(P,P∗);
6: end if
7: end for
8: return P;
Now, we design secure algorithms for minimum selection.
We first consider the two-bid case. Suppose that the AR holds
two EBV bids, denoted by
e(vA) = (E(σA1 ), E(σ
A
2 ), ..., E(σ
A
K)), and
e(vB) = (E(σB1 ), E(σ
B
2 ), ..., E(σ
B
K))
(3)
It can compute the location of the minimum bid as
RminAB = (σ
A
1 ⊕ σ
B
1 )σ
A
1 + (σ
A
1 ⊕ σ
B
1 ⊕ 1)(σ
A
2 ⊕ σ
B
2 )σ
A
2 +
(σA1 ⊕ σ
B
1 ⊕ 1)(σ
A
2 ⊕ σ
B
2 ⊕ 1)(σ
A
3 ⊕ σ
B
3 )σ
A
3 + ...+
(σA1 ⊕ σ
B
1 ⊕ 1)...(σ
A
K−1 ⊕ σ
B
K−1 ⊕ 1)(σ
A
K ⊕ σ
B
K)σ
A
K
(4)
on the encrypted bits, where RminAB is defined as
RminAB =
{
0, if vA ≤ vB
1, if vA > vB
(5)
Therefore, we can design the secure algorithm for two-bid
minimum selection as shown in Algorithm 4. Note that the
order of the two bids matters in the result. If the two bids are
equal, the first one is picked up.
Based on Algorithm 4, we can develop the algorithm for
multi-bid minimum selection as shown in Algorithm 5.
In Algorithm 5, the inputs are EBV bids of a set of bidders
indexed from 1 to n. e(vi∗) represents the minimum EBV bid
of bidders from bidders 1 to i. Rmini∗,i+1 denotes the comparison
5Algorithm 4 TwoBidMin(e(vA), e(vB))
Input:
EBV bids e(vA) and e(vB)
Output:
Comparison result E(RminAB ) and minimum bid e(vAB)
1: Compute Line 2 to 9 over encrypted bits E(σAi ) and
E(σBi ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ K .
// For clarity, we describe these lines by plain bits.
2: for (i = 1; i <= K; ++i) do
3: xABi = σ
A
i ⊕ σ
B
i ; x
AB∗
i = x
AB
i ⊕ 1;
4: end for
5: RminAB = x
AB
1 · σ
A
1 ; R = 1;
6: for (i = 2; i <= K; ++i) do
7: R = R · xAB∗i−1 ;
8: RminAB = R
min
AB +R · x
AB
i · σ
A
i ;
9: end for
10: Compute e(vAB) = (E(σAB1 ), E(σAB2 ), ..., E(σABK )),
where σABj = σAj · (1−RminAB ) + σBj ·RminAB , 1 ≤ j ≤ K;
11: return (E(RminAB ), e(vAB));
Algorithm 5 MultiBidMin(E(B))
Input:
EBV bids E(B) = {e(vi)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}
Output:
Comparison result E(Rmin1,n ) and minimum bid e(vn∗)
1: (E(Rmin1,2 ), e(v
2∗)) = TwoBidMin(e(v1), e(v2));
2: for (i = 2; i < n; ++i) do
3: (E(Rmini∗,i+1), e(v(i+1)∗)) = TwoBidMin(e(vi∗), e(vi+1));
4: E(Rmin1,i+1) = E(R
min
1,i ·(1−R
min
i∗,i+1)+(i+1)·R
min
i∗,i+1);
5: end for
6: return (E(Rmin1,n ), e(vn∗));
result of the minimum bid of bidders from 1 to i and the bid
of bidder i+1, with 0 meaning the former is not greater than
the latter, 1 otherwise. Rmin1,i denotes the index (starting from
0) of the first bidder with the minimum bid among the bidders
from 1 to i.
It is trivial to use Algorithms 4 and 5 for maximum selection
(by inverting the bits of EBV bids and then calling the mini-
mum selection algorithms). In the following, we directly use
algorithms TwoBidMax(.,.) and MultiBidMax(.) for maximum
selection.
B. Secure Auction Design
Based on the secure bid representation and operations, we
now present the secure auction design. Our main idea is that
the auction agent first runs the key generation algorithm of
Paillier cryptosystem, and publishes the public key to the
auctioneer and the bidders. Next, all bidders convert their bids
to EBV bids using the public key, and send these EBV bids
to the auctioneer. Then, the auctioneer computes the auction
on the EBV bids and gets an encrypted auction result, with
the help of the auction agent. Finally, the auctioneer gets
the auction result by asking the auction agent to decrypt it,
and reports the auction result to the bidders. As long as the
auctioneer and the auction agent do not collude with each
other, they can get nothing about the bids, except the auction
result. PS-TRUST includes three steps as follows.
1) Buyer Group Formation: Buyers submit their location
information to the auctioneer, who generates a conflict graph
of buyers based on the information. Without knowing the bid
values of the buyers, the auctioneer forms buyers into non-
conflict buyer groups based on the conflict graph. Specifically,
the auctioneer forms buyer groups by finding independent sets
in the conflict graph repeatedly. To find an independent set,
the auctioneer randomly chooses a node in the current conflict
graph to add to the set, eliminates the node and its neighbors,
and updates the conflict graph. This is repeated recursively
until the conflict graph is empty, then an independent set is
found. We denote by G = {G1,G2, ...,GH} the set of non-
conflict buyer groups formed.
2) Secure Auction Computation: In this step, all bidders
submit their EBV bids to the auctioneer. Then, the auctioneer
and the auction agent cooperate to securely compute the
auction. This step can be divided into further two steps:
(1) Buyer Group Bidding
For each buyer group Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ H), the auctioneer finds
its minimum EBV bid e(vmini ) by calling (RminGi , e(v
min
i )) =
MultiBidMin (E(Gi)), and compute its EBV group bid
e(vgi ) = EBVMul(e(vmini ), ni), where E(Gi) denotes the
EBV bid set of group Gi, and ni = |Gi|. Note that the
auctioneer knows nothing about the buyers’ bids. At the end,
the auctioneer holds the EBV group bid of each buyer group.
(2) Winner Determination
A natural idea for winner determination proceeds as follows.
The auctioneer finds the encrypted seller index (starting from
1) E(α) with the minimum bid in the seller set S, the en-
crypted buyer group index E(β) with the maximum group bid
in the buyer group set G, and their corresponding EBV bids
(using Algorithm 5), then compares the two EBV bids to get
an encrypted result (using Algorithm 4). E(α), E(β), and the
comparison result are sent to the auction agent, who decrypts
these encrypted data, and sends the decrypted information (α,
β, and the comparison result) back to the auctioneer. Then if
the trading condition, namely, the maximum group bid is not
less than the minimum seller bid, is satisfied, the auctioneer
removes α from S, β from G, and adds α to a winner-candidate
seller set Ws, β to a winner-candidate buyer group set Wg.
Otherwise, the auction is over. This process can be repeated to
find the winner-candidate seller-buyer-group pairs until either
the seller set or the buyer group set is empty, or the trading
condition is unsatisfied. At last, the auctioneer removes the
last added seller αc from Ws, treating it as the critical seller,
and removes the last added buyer group βc from Wg , treating
it as the critical buyer group. Then, the auctioneer reports the
sellers in Ws and the buyers belonging to the buyer groups
in Wg as winners, and the bid of αc and the group bid of
βc (which are decrypted by auction agent) as the selling and
buying clearing prices, respectively.
The idea above seems to work well: the auctioneer and the
6auction agent cooperate to determine the winners and no exact
bids are leaked to them. However, there is some information
about the bids leaking. Specifically, the ranking orders of the
winning sellers’ bids and the winning buyer groups’ group
bids are leaked to both the auctioneer and the auction agent.
The leaked information is obviously more than what we can
infer from the auction result including the winner sets and the
clearing prices. Thus, in the sense of cryptography, the above
procedure is not really secure.
In order to make this natural procedure of winner determina-
tion secure, something has to be done to hide the bid ranking
orders of winners. Our idea is that, the auctioneer uses the
randomized seller set S′ and buyer group set G′, instead of
the original ones, so that each time when the auction agent
decrypts the comparison result of a seller-buyer-group pair, he
does not know which the pairs are. The auction agent then
indicates the selected winner-candidate pairs by encrypted bit
vectors, which are sufficient for computing the next winner-
candidate pair while reveals nothing about the selection orders
to the auctioneer. Finally, when the auction is over, the auction
result is decrypted by the auction agent to the auctioneer.
The improved winner determination procedure is depicted in
Protocol 6. Some details are explained as follows.
In Step AE1, the auctioneer applies random permutations
pis and pig to seller set S and buyer group set G, respectively,
getting the randomized sets S′ and G′. Note that only the
auctioneer knows the permutations.
In Step AA2, two bit vectors ws and wg are defined to
indicate the winner locations in the randomized sets S′ and G′,
respectively.wsk = 1 if seller sik is a candidate winner, wsk = 0
otherwise, and wgk = 1 if buyer group Gjk is a candidate
winner, wgk = 0 otherwise. αc and βc index the critical seller
and buyer group, respectively.
In Step AE3, similarly to the natural idea, the encrypted
seller index E(α) with the minimum bid and the encrypted
buyer group index E(β) with the maximum bid, together with
their EBV bids are computed using Algorithm 5. The resulted
two EBV bids are then compared using Algorithm 4. These
computation results remain in the encrypted form, unknown
to the auctioneer. Note that, different from the natural idea,
the randomized sets S′ and G′ are used instead.
In Step AA4, the auction agent decrypts the computation
results in Step AE3, knowing the locations of the candidate-
winner pair in the randomized sets S′ and G′. However, he
does not know the random permutations, so he cannot know
the true candidate winners. Line 12 tests if the buyer group’s
bid is not less than the seller’s bid. If so, the auction agent
sets the corresponding bits of ws and wg to 1, saves indexes of
the last candidate-winner pair, and sends E(ws), E(wg) and
Rmaxβα to the auctioneer. Otherwise, the auction is over, and
auction agent removes the last candidate-winner pair (i.e. the
critical seller αc and buyer group βc) from candidate winner
sets by setting the corresponding bits of ws and wg to 0. The
auction agent then sends the plain values including ws, wg
and Rmaxαβ to the auctioneer.
In Step AE5, Line 22 tests if seller α and buyer group β can
Protocol 6 Winner Determination
Input:
Auctioneer (AE) holds:
EBV bids e(vsi ) of seller si, for 1 ≤ i ≤M ;
EBV group bids e(vgj ) of buyer group Gj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ H ;
Seller set S = {s1, s2, ..., sM};
Buyer group set G = {G1,G2, ...,GH}.
Output:
Auctioneer and Auction Agent (AA) hold:
The selling and buying clearing prices vsc and vgc ;
Winning seller set Ws;
Winning buyer group set Wg.
Step AE1: AE Initialization:
1: Ws = ∅; Wg = ∅;
2: S′ = pis(S) = {si1 , si2 , ..., siM };
3: G′ = pig(G) = {Gj1 ,Gj2 , ...,GjH};
Step AA2: AA Initialization:
4: ws = (ws1, w
s
2, ..., w
s
M ) = (0, 0, ..., 0);
5: wg = (wg1 , w
g
2 , ..., w
g
H) = (0, 0, ..., 0);
6: αc = −1; βc = −1;
Step AE3: Finding a Seller-Buyer-Group Pair:
7: (E(α), e(vsα)) = MultiBidMin(E(S′));
8: (E(β), e(vgβ)) = MultiBidMax(E(G′));
9: (E(Rmaxβα ), e(v
max
βα )) = TwoBidMax(e(v
g
β), e(v
s
α));
10: AE sends E(α), E(β), and E(Rmaxβα ) to AA;
Step AA4: Determining a Winner-Candidate Pair:
11: α = D(E(α)); β = D(E(β)); Rmaxβα = D(E(R
max
βα ));
12: if (Rmaxβα == 0) then
13: wsα+1 = 1; w
g
β+1 = 1;
14: αc = α; βc = β;
15: E(ws) = (E(ws1), E(w
s
2), ..., E(w
s
M ));
16: E(wg) = (E(wg1), E(w
g
2), ..., E(w
g
H));
17: AA sends E(ws), E(wg), and Rmaxβα to AE;
18: else
19: wsαc+1 = 0; w
g
βc+1
= 0;
20: AA sends ws, wg and Rmaxβα to AE;
21: end if
Step AE5: Auction Repeating:
22: if (Rmaxβα == 0) then
23: e(vsc) = e(v
s
α); e(v
g
c ) = e(v
g
β);
24: Computes e(vsik) = (E(σ
s∗
ik ,1
), E(σs∗ik ,2), ..., E(σ
s∗
ik ,K
)),
where σs∗ik,p = σ
s
ik,p
+wsk · (1− σ
s
ik,p
), 1 ≤ p ≤ K , for
all 1 ≤ k ≤M ;
25: Computes e(vgjk ) = (E(σ
g∗
jk,1
), E(σg∗jk ,2), ..., E(σ
g∗
jk ,K
)),
where σg∗jk ,p = σ
g
jk,p
− wgk · σ
g
jk,p
, 1 ≤ p ≤ K , for all
1 ≤ k ≤ H ;
26: Goto Step AE3;
27: end if
Step AE6: Auction Opening:
28: AE gets vsc and vgc by asking AA to decrypt e(vsc) and
e(vgc );
29: Ws = {sik |w
s
k = 1, ∀1 ≤ k ≤M};
30: Wg = {Gik |w
g
k = 1, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ H};
7be included to the winner-candidate sets. If so, the auctioneer
first saves the EBV bids of the last winner-candidate pair in
Line 23, and then updates the EBV bids of all sellers and all
buyer groups in Lines 24 and 25, respectively. This updating
results that the bid of seller sik is set to (2K − 1) if wsk ==
1, while remains unchanged otherwise, and the bid of buyer
group Gjk is set to 0 if w
g
k == 1, while remains unchanged
otherwise. That is, all selected winner-candidate sellers are
mapped to a maximum value (2K−1), and all selected winner-
candidate buyer groups are mapped to a minimum bid value
0. As long as the normal bid satisfies 0 < v < 2K − 1,
the selected winner candidates will not be selected in Step
AE3, and the updating is equivalent to removing the winner
candidates from the seller set and buyer group set. After doing
this updating, the execution goes to Step AE3. If the test of
Line 22 fails, the auction repeating is over and the execution
goes to Step AE6.
In step AE6, the auctioneer gets vsc and vgc by asking
the auction agent to decrypt e(vsc) and e(vgc ), and computes
the winner sets Ws and Wg from ws and wg using the
randomization permutations in Step AE1.
Note that in Line 13 and 19 in Protocol 6, the need of
“adding one” is caused by different ways of indexing, i.e., α
and β returned by Algorithms 4 or 5 are starting from 0, while
the indexes of sellers and buyer groups are from 1.
3) Pricing: Each spectrum channel is sold from the win-
ning sellers at the selling clearing price vsc , and bought by the
winning buyer groups at the buying clearing price vgc . Each
winner buyer in winning buyer group Gk pays the equal share
of the buying clearing price, that is vgc/nk, where nk = |Gk|.
From the description above, we can see that PS-TRUST
exactly follows the auction procedure of TRUST. Therefore,
PS-TRUST maintains the properties of economic-robustness
and spectrum reuse of TRUST, in the presence of semi-honest
adversaries.
C. Security Analysis
In the sense of cryptography, the standard definition of
security against semi-honest adversaries can be described as
follows [4].
Definition 2 (Security against Semi-honest Adversaries). Let
f(x, y) be a functionality with two inputs x and y, and
two outputs fA(x, y) and fB(x, y). Suppose that protocol Π
computes functionality f(x, y) between two parties Alice and
Bob. Let V ΠA (x, y) (resp. V ΠB (x, y)) represent Alice’s (resp.
Bob’s) view during an execution of Π on (x, y). In other words,
if (x, rΠA) (resp. (y, rΠB)) denotes Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) input and
randomness, then
V ΠA (x, y) = (x, r
Π
A,m1,m2, ...,mt), and
V ΠB (x, y) = (y, r
Π
B ,m1,m2, ...,mt)
where {mi} denote the messages passed between the par-
ties. Let OΠA (resp. OΠB) denote Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) out-
put after an execution of Π on (x, y), and OΠ(x, y) =
(OΠA(x, y), O
Π
B(x, y)). Then we say that protocol Π is secure
(or protects privacy) against semi-honest adversaries if there
exist probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) simulators S1 and
S2 such that
{(S1(x, fA(x, y)), f(x, y))}
c
≡ {(V ΠA (x, y), O
Π(x, y))} (6)
{(S2(x, fB(x, y)), f(x, y))}
c
≡ {(V ΠB (x, y), O
Π(x, y))} (7)
where c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
With the above security definition, we now prove the basic
lemma that will allow us to argue that our auction solution is
secure against semi-honest adversaries. Lemma 1 is similar to
Lemma 1 in [22], with slight difference and some extension.
Lemma 1. Suppose that Alice has run the key generation
algorithm for semantically secure homomorphic public-key
encryption scheme, and has given her public key to Bob.
Suppose also that Alice and Bob run Protocol X , for which
all messages passed from Alice to Bob are encrypted using
this scheme, or only carry information that can be completely
inferred from the output of Bob, and all messages passed from
Bob to Alice are uniformly distributed in their value ranges
and independent of Bob’s inputs, or only carry information
that can be completely inferred from the output of Alice. Then
Protocol X is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof: We prove the security of Protocol X in two separate
cases, depending on which party the adversary has corrupted.
To prove security, we show that for all PPT adversaries, the
adversary’s view based on Alice and Bob’s interaction is indis-
tinguishable to the adversary’s view when the corrupted party
interacts with a simulator instead. In other words, we show
that there exist simulators S1 and S2 that satisfy conditions
(6) and (7).
Case 1: Bob is corrupted. We simulate Alice’s messages sent
to Bob. For each encrypted message that Alice is supposed to
send to Bob, we let the simulator S2 pick a random element
from ZN , and send an encryption of this. Any adversary who
can distinguish between interaction with Alice versus interac-
tion with S2 can be used to break the security assumptions
of the used encryption scheme. Thus, no such PPT adversary
exists. For each (plain) message that only carries information
that can be completely inferred from the output of Bob, the
simulator S2 can of course simulate it using Bob’s output of
the functionality (fB(x, y) in equation (7)).Thus, condition (7)
holds.
Case 2: Alice is corrupted. We simulate Bob’s messages
sent to Alice. For each message that is uniformly distributed
in its value range and independent of Bob’s inputs, simulator
S1 picks a random element from its range and sends to Alice.
Again, equation (6) holds due to the fact that Alice cannot
distinguish the simulator’s random element from the correct
element that has been randomized by Bob over its value range.
For each message that only carries information that can be
completely inferred from the output of Alice, the simulator
S1 can simulate it using Alice’s output of the functionality
(fA(x, y) in equation (6)). Thus, condition (6) holds.
8Thus, we can conclude that Protocol X is secure against
semi-honest adversaries. 
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 is secure against semi-honest adver-
saries.
Proof: It is obvious that all messages passed from AR to
KH are uniformly distributed in the ciphertext space ZN2 (or
the values obtained by decrypting the messages are uniformly
distributed in the plaintext space ZN ), and the messages
passed from KH to AR are encrypted. According to Lemma
1, Protocol 1 is secure against semi-honest adversaries. 
Theorem 2. Suppose that the auction agent has run the key
generation algorithm for semantically secure homomorphic
public-key encryption scheme, and has given its public key
to the auctioneer. Further suppose that the auctioneer runs
Algorithm X (where X is one of 2, 3, 4, 5), and holds
the computation result. Then the resulting protocol is secure
against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof: The resulting protocol has no messages exchanged,
except sequentially calling Protocol 1 which is secure against
semi-honest adversaries, so due to Lemma 1 and sequen-
tial composition theory [5], it is secure against semi-honest
adversaries.
Theorem 3. Protocol 6 is secure against semi-honest adver-
saries.
Proof: We show that all the messages exchanged between
the parties satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1. Then, applying
Lemma 1 and the sequential composition theory [5], Protocol
6 is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Specifically, suppose that there are Q winner-candidate pairs
(including the critical seller and buyer group), we can list all
the messages exchanged between the parties as follows.
Messages sent from AE to AA include:
{E(αi)}
Q+1
1 , {E(βi)}
Q+1
1 , {E(R
max
βiαi
)}Q+11 , e(v
s
c), e(v
g
c )
Message sent from AA to AE include:
{E(wsi )}
Q
1 , {E(w
g
i )}
Q
1 ,w
s
Q+1,w
g
Q+1, {R
max
βiαi
}Q+11 , v
s
c , v
g
c
Now we show that all these messages satisfy the conditions
of Lemma 1. First, among the messages sent from AE to
AA, αi and βi (obtained by decrypting E(αi) and E(βi)) are
uniformly distributed over their value ranges (i.e. [1..M ] and
[1..H ]) due to the random permutations unknown to AA, and
messages Rmaxβiαi , v
s
c and vgc can be completely inferred from
the output of AA, which is also the auction result including
selling and buying clearing prices vsc , vgc , and the winner sets
W
s and Gg. Second, among the messages sent from AA to
AE, messages E(wsi ) and E(w
g
i ) are encrypted, and messages
wsQ+1, w
g
Q+1, R
max
βiαi
, vsc and vgc can be completely determined
by the output of the auctioneer, which is also the auction
result. As a result, all the messages in Protocol 6 satisfy the
conditions of Lemma 1.
Furthermore, according to Theorem 2, subprotocols resulted
from running Algorithms 4 and 5 (i.e. calling MultiBidMin(.),
TABLE I
COMPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITIES
Protocol/Algorithm 1 2 3 4 5
Complexity O(1) O(K) O(K2) O(K) O(nK)
MultiBidMax(.) and TwoBidMax(., .)) are secure against
semi-honest adversaries. Then, applying Lemma 1 and sequen-
tial composition theory, we can conclude that Protocol 6 is
secure against semi-honest adversaries. 
Now, we can conclude PS-TRUST is secure against semi-
honest adversaries.
Theorem 4. PS-TRUST is a two-party protocol secure against
semi-honest adversaries, between the auctioneer and the auc-
tion agent. Additionally, anyone (i.e. the auctioneer, auction
agent, and each bidder) cannot know anything about the bids
beyond the auction result through the auction.
The proof is obvious based on the previous theorems, and
we only sketch it here. Note that in the auction, we implicitly
assume that the bidders’ bids are the only privacy needed to
protect. So, steps of Buyer Group Formation and Pricing of
the auctions are unrelated to the security. That is, we only
need to prove that the step of Secure Auction Computation
is secure. By Theorem 3, the winner determination procedure
is secure, and we can similarly prove the security of buyer
group bidding procedure. Thus, PS-TRUST is secure against
semi-honest adversaries. What is more, because bidders’ bids
are encrypted in EBV form, and are input to the auctioneer,
according to the definition of security, neither the auctioneer
nor the auction agent knows anything about the bids, and no
bidder knows anything about other bidders’ bids, except the
auction result.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
As PS-TRUST exactly follows the procedure of TRUST,
the auction efficiency is the same as that of TRUST. So, we
only focus on the analysis and evaluation of computation and
communication overhead caused by the security measures.
A. Performance Analysis
The analysis of computation and communication complexi-
ties for Protocols/Algorithms from 1 to 5 is straightforward
and the results are listed in Tab. I. We thus can find the
computation complexity of Protocol 6 (which is also the
computation complexity PS-TRUST) is O((M +N) ·K ·W )
operations (e.g. addition or multiplication) of big integers,
where W represents the number of seller-buyer-group winner
pairs. Similarly, we can find the communication complexity of
PS-TRUST is O((M +N) ·K ·W ) times of bit length of big
integers. Note that, practical running time and message volume
will be impacted by the bit length used in the homomorphic
encryption scheme.
9B. Performance Evaluation
We implement PS-TRUST using Java in Windows XP with
Intel’s Core 2 Duo CPU 2.93GHz. We let the buyers be ran-
domly distributed in an area of 100m×100m, let the protection
distance be 50m, and let default experimental setting be as
follows: the bit length of homomorphic encryption scheme is
512, i.e., N ’s bit length is 512; the bit length K of EBV is
8; the numbers (M,N) of sellers and buyers are (10, 30). All
experimental results are averaged on 10 random repetitions.
Fig. 3 shows the curves of running times and message
volumes of PS-TRUST as (M,N) vary from (10, 30) to
(30, 70). Both performance measures grow slightly faster than
linear growth according to (M+N). This is because according
to the theoretical results, these measures also depend on W ,
which increases as well with (M +N) on average.
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Fig. 3. Overhead Evaluation as the Numbers of Sellers and Buyers Vary
Fig. 4 show the curves of running times and message
volumes of PS-TRUST as K vary from 8 to 24. We can see
that all the curves are roughly linear to K . This is consistent
with the theoretical results fairly well.
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From the analytical and experimental results above, we can
see that both running times and message volumes are feasible
for practical applications. Furthermore, the running time of the
auctioneer (AE) is about a third more than that of the auction
agent (AA), and the message volume of AE is about twice of
that of the AA. Finally, the running times can be reduced by
parallel computing if needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed PS-TRUST, the first prov-
ably secure solution to truthful double spectrum auctions.
Previous studies on secure spectrum auctions did not provide
adequate security, as they revealed information about the bids
beyond the auction result. Different from those studies, we
have achieved security in the sense of cryptography in this
work. Specifically, PS-TRUST reveals nothing about the bids
to any participant, except the auction result including clearing
prices and winner sets. We have also proved formally the secu-
rity of PS-TRUST in the presence of semi-honest adversaries.
Finally, we have implemented PS-TRUST in Java, and have
theoretically and experimentally shown that the computation
and communication overhead of PS-TRUST is modest, and its
practical applications are feasible.
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